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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. , 
GREG DOTY, 
Case No. 
Category 
880657-CA 
No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1988). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Supplying Alcohol to 
a Minor, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue in this appeal is whether or not the trial court 
abused its discretion in allowing the State at tne close of its 
case to amend the information from charging Contributing to tne 
Delinquency of a Minor to tne near identical offense of Supplying 
Alcohol to a Minor. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Utah R. Crirn. P. 4(d), Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-4(d) (1982): 
The court may permit an indictment or 
information to be amended at any time before 
verdict if no additional or different offense 
is charged and the substantial rights of the 
defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, 
an indictment or information may be amended 
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s o a s t o s t a t e t h e o f f e n s e w i t h s u c h 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y a s t o b a r a s u b s e q u e n t 
p r o s e c u t i o n f o r t r i e same o f f e n s e upon t h e 
same s e t of f a c t s . 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 3 d - 1 9 ( 1 ) ( d ) ( 1 9 8 7 ) : 
T h e c o u r t s h a l l h a v e c o n c u r r e n t 
j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t r y t h e f o l l o w i n g a d u l t s fo r 
o f f e n s e s commit ted a g a i n s t c h i l d r e n : 
a n y p e r s o n 18 y e a r s of a g e o r o l d e r who 
p r o v i d e s a c h i l d w i t h an a l c o h o l i c b e v e r a g e 
or a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e or who e n c o u r a g e s 
or p e r m i t s a c h i l d t o consume an a l c o h o l i c 
b e v e r a g e or c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e . 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-8(1) ( 1 9 8 6 ) : 
No person shaLl sell, of fee to sell, or 
otherwise furnish or supply any alcoholic 
beverage or product to any person under tne 
age of 21 years. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with two (2) counts of 
Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor, a Class B 
Misdemeanor. A bench trial was held on June 30, 1988, before the 
Fifth Circuit Court for Iron County, Cedar City Department, tne 
Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite presiding. The State's evidence 
showed both of the minors involved were 18 years old at the time 
of the alleged offenses. At the close of the State's case, 
defense counsel moved to dismiss for failure to establish a prima 
facie case. In response, the State moved to amend the 
information to Supplying Alcohol to a Minor (under the age of 21 
years). The trial court qranted the State's motion over 
defendant's objection. Trial proceeded. The trial court found 
defendant guilty of one (1) count and ordered him placed on 
probation for six (6) months and required him to pay a fine of 
one hundred sixty dollars (^160.00). 
STATLMENT OF RhhEVANT FACTS 
On June lb, 1988, Officer Rulon Hardy of the Cedar City 
Police Department, alter a valid traffic stop, placed defendant 
Greg Doty under arrest ror Supplying Alcohol to a Minor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 32A-i2-8 (1986). (R. L, T. 10) 
Officer Hardy also arrested tne defendant's two (2) companions, 
Jarod Larsen and Scott Bonzo, for Unlawful Consumption of 
Alcohol, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-13 (1986). 
(1. 10; The information filed by the Iron County Attorney 
inadvertently charged defendant with two (2) counts of 
Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § /8-3a-19(1)(d) (1987). (R. 7,8) 
At trial, and as part of tne State's case, Officer Hardy 
testified that defendant stated he had purchased tne beer located 
m his vehicle, (T. 9) Jarod Larsen testified that he was 18 at 
the time of the arrest. (T. 13) Mr. Larsen also testified ne 
drank four (4) beo>s during the evenincj while sitting in the 
front seat with defendant and Scott Bonzo, and he observed Mr. 
Bonzo drink one (1) or two (2) beers himself. (T. 14, 15) Mr. 
Bonzo testified he was 18 at the time of the arrest. (T. 27) 
Mr. Bonzo also testified he drank four (4) beers during the 
course of the evening. (T. ii) He further testified ne did not 
hide his drmking from defendant and that defendant "probably 
could have seen [him].'1 (T. 35) 
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After the State rested, defendant, through his counsel, 
moved to dismiss for failure to show a prima tacie case. He 
explained section 78-3a-19(1)(d) falls under the Juvenile Code 
and applies to minors under the age of 18. fnerefore tne statute 
did not apply to Mr. Larsen and Mr. Bonzo. (T. 38, 39) Tne 
State countered, arguing tne evidence set forth satisfied the 
provisions of botn sections 7 8-3a-19(l)(d) and 32A-12-8, 
Supplying Alcohol to a Minor. (T. 39) The trial court found the 
charging languaqe in botn provisions to be basically the same. 
(T. 39) The trial court also noted the original citation charged 
section 32A-12-8. (T. 40) Defendant made clear his strenuous 
objection and pointed out to the trial court that unlike 
Contributing to tne Delinquency of a Minor, Supplying Alcohol to 
a Minor is a Class A Misdemeanor. (T. 40, 41) The State 
formally moved to reopen and amend tne information accordingly 
and stipulated to any requested continuance. (T. 41, 43) The 
trial court granted the motion, agreeing to sentence defendant, 
if found guilty, pursuant to a class B misdemeanor rather tnan a 
class A misdemeanor. (T. 41, 42) Trial continued with defendant 
testifying on his own behalf and Officer Hardy testifying on 
rebuttal. (T. 43-59, 60-61) The trial court found defendant 
guilty of one (1) count involving Mr. Bonzo. (T. 65) The court 
imposed sentence of ten (10) days suspended, with probation 
ordered together with a fine of one hundred sixty dollars 
(5160.00). (T. 67) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State ot Utah contends the trial court acted well within 
its discretion in permitting the amendment to tne information. 
The two (2) subject offenses are qenerally tne same. Moreover, 
defendant had fair notice of both possible cnarges. Therefore 
the substantial rights of defendant were not prejudiced and the 
amendment was proper under tne rule. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY OF A MINOR 
AND SUPPLYING ALCOHOL TO A MINOR ARE 
VIRTUALLY THE SAME OFFENSE; THEREFORE, NO 
ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT OFFENSE WAS CHARGED. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4d states, in part, "The court may permit 
an . information to be amended . . . if no additional or 
different offense is charged . . . ." Defendant does not allege 
that an additional offense was charged by the amendment at issue. 
Rather, defendant argues tne amendment charged a different 
offense and was therefore in violation of the rule. 
Section /8-3a-19(l)(d), the statute cited in the 
intormation, proscribes the providing of an alconolic beverage to 
a child under the age of 18. Section 32A-12-8, the statute cited 
in the original citation, proscribes the supplying of an 
alcoholic beverage to an individual under the age of 21 years. 
Webster defines provide db "to supply for use" and supply as "to 
provide for." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 921, 1126 
(1979). In other words, usinq the instant case, had Mr. Larsen 
and Mr. Bonzo both been under the age of 18 years, defendant's 
conduct would clearly be in violation ot both statutes. Tne only 
-5-
difference between the two (2) provisions is the age of the 
victim. However, as one court has neld, amending an information 
by chanqinq the victim is essentially an amendment of form, not 
substance. McKee v. People, 175 Colo. 410, 487 P.2d 1332 (1971). 
Granted, the amendment did substitute one (1) statute for 
another. Defendant cites this Court's opinion m State v. Ramon, 
736 P,2d 1059 (Utah App. 1987), in support of nis position. In 
Ramon , the trial court granted the State's motion, made on the 
day of trial, to amend an information charqing Theft by 
Receiving, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1988), to include the Theft 
by Concealing provision within the same statute. This Court 
reversed tne defendants' convictions only after a review of Utah 
case law established separate distinct elements for the two (2) 
offenses. In contrast, the trial court in the instant case 
specifically round the amendment contained "basically the same 
charging language . . . ." (T. 39) Such a rinding can only be 
set aside if tnis Court determines it to be clearly erroneous, 
i.e., if it is clearly against the weight ot the evidence or this 
Court reacnes a firm, definite conviction that a mistake has been 
made. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah 
App. 1987). Tne trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous. 
The amendment did not change the basic charge. State v. 
Peterson , 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984/. Rather, two (2) statues 
exist, under different sections of tne code, proscribing the 
identical conduct. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED FAIR NOTICE AND ADEQUATE 
O P P O R T U N I T Y TO P R E P A R E HIS D E F E N S E ; 
THEREFORE, HIS SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS WERE NOT 
PREJUDICED. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d) also states, in part, "The court may 
permit an . information to be amended if the 
substantial riqhts of the defendant are not pre] ud iced, " In 
State v. Kirgan, 712 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1985), the Utan Supreme 
Court held, "The trial court must determine if a defendant was 
misled or surprised and therefore prejudiced by an amended 
information." Clearly, defendant Weds not misled, surprised, nor 
prejudiced by the amended information in the instant case. As 
the trial court found, and as the record supports, the original 
citation issued by the officer to defendant charged him with a 
violation of section 32A-12-8, thereby putting him on notice as 
to every element ol the of tense against which he would be 
required to defend. (R. 1, T. 40) The State's inadvertence in 
charging another similar statute in the information was not a 
prejudicial error but rather a clerical one. The subsequent need 
to amend the information was clearly foreseeable to defendant. 
His defense was not prejudiced since the young men's ages were 
never a disputed issue. 
POINT III 
THE AMENDED INFORMATION PROTECTED DEFENDANT 
AGAINST ANOTHER PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME 
OFFENSE. 
Defendant contends Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1978) bars a 
subsequent prosecution of defendant. On the contrary, section 
76-1-402 bars a second prosecution under a different provision 
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for the same act under a single criminal episode only after "an 
acquittal or conviction." Had the trial court denied the State's 
motion to amend, the court would likely have granted defendant's 
motion to dismiss. That does not constitute an acquittal. 
Furthermore, a final judgment of dismissal is appealable by the 
State under Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3)(a), Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
26(3) (a) (1988). The amendment in the instant case was therefore 
proper and reasonable to protect defendant against another 
prosecution for the same offense. State v. Strand, 674 P.2d 109 
(Utan 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court acted reasonably and properly in granting 
the State's motion to amend the information. The two (2) 
offenses involved are virtually the same offense. Defendant 
received adequate, proper, advance notice in order to properly 
prepare his defense. Furthermore, said amendment protected 
defendant from further prosecution for the same offense. The 
State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
DATED this / l day of February, 1989. 
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